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Abstract:  This paper addresses the topic of cyclicality and discretion in Irish fiscal policy. In
particular, we show that the level and nature of cyclicality varies across different expenditure
components and we introduce a new definition of feasible discretion to take account of political
imperatives in budgetary management. We find that overall government expenditure is acyclical
and is most heavily influenced by a fiscal parsimony objective. Automatic stabilisers are efficiently
counter-cyclical, feasible discretionary government consumption growth is orthogonal to economic
fundamentals while feasible discretionary investment growth is strongly pro-cyclical. Using




rish fiscal policy management has fallen into sharper focus in recent years,
particularly in the advent and aftermath of membership of Economic and
Monetary Union. Agrowing emphasis on budgetary management is something
of a global phenomenon with dissent about the conduct of monetary policy
fading as a general consensus emerges in favour of monetary stability. Taylor
(2000) points out that the environment in which discretionary counter-cyclical
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factors: monetary policy has become more transparent and more reactive to
changes in both inflation and output; and the emergence of new normative
macroeconomics with an emphasis on evaluating policy rules.
Ireland is an interesting subject for study as fiscal outturns were wildly
volatile over the course of the past three decades. Given the health of the
public finances since the mid-1990s, the fiscal policy decision-making process
is unlikely to have been distorted by pressure arising from the Maastricht
criteria and, subsequently, the Stability and Growth Pact. 
The existing body of work will be augmented by an analysis of the
interaction between cyclicality, political choices and decomposed government
expenditure for Ireland over the course of the 1969-2003 period. This paper
highlights the cyclicalities of Irish government consumption, current transfers
and investment adjusted to take account of both legal obligations and political
imperatives and also examines the efficiency of automatic stabilisers.
Attention is paid to the rank of government investment spending within the
budgetary-formation process.
II THEORETICAL BACKDROP
The neo-classical view that government spending’s share of GDP should
behave counter-cyclically is intuitively appealing given that pro-cyclical
responses of fiscal policy exacerbate underlying fluctuations in consumption
and output. Traditional Keynesian analysis suggests that fiscal policy should
be counter-cyclical with government increasing spending and reducing taxes
during recessionary periods and adopting an opposite stance during upturns.
Under such a policy, there would be a positive correlation between tax rates
and output while the correlation between government spending and output
would be negative. 
However, tax-smoothing models, inspired by Barro (1979), posit that policy
should remain neutral over the cycle. This approach predicts a constant tax
rate, pro-cyclical revenues and counter-cyclical deficits. Execution of this
policy would manifest itself in zero correlation between tax rates and output
and spending and output. Taylor (2000) is supportive of this view suggesting
that it would be reasonable in the present US context for discretionary fiscal
policy to be saved explicitly for longer-term issues, requiring less frequent
changes. OECD economies seem to follow this prescription with Backus,
Kehoe and Kydland (1995) showing that the correlations in these countries
between government consumption and output appear to be low in absolute
value. 
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there is widespread agreement that counter-cyclical discretionary fiscal policy
is neither desirable nor politically feasible. Such a claim should be regarded as
something of an overstatement particularly in light of the aggressive counter-
cyclicality of US fiscal policy during the most recent economic downturn.
Indeed, given concerns about the potential inertia of monetary policy at times
when nominal interest rates are low and given the real threat of deflation, the
desirability and feasibility of counter-cyclical discretionary fiscal policy have
been enhanced in the early years of this decade. Recent experiences also erode
Eichenbaum’s observation that practical debates about stabilisation policy
revolve almost exclusively around monetary policy. 
2.1 Previous Empirics
In conflict with the theoretical foundations, a number of empirical studies
have found that pro-cyclicality is, in fact, commonplace. Gavin and Perotti
(1997), in a study of Latin American countries, show that fiscal policy is pro-
cyclical and suggest that this phenomenon is due to the difficulties
experienced by developing nations in accessing international credit flows
during cyclical downturns. Their work was supported by Talvi and Vegh (2000)
who suggest that pro-cyclical fiscal policy is so pervasive in the world economy
that it should arguably be regarded as the rule rather than the exception. In
a sample of 56 countries, they show that fiscal policy is acyclical among G7
countries, pro-cyclical among non-G7 industrial countries and strongly pro-
cyclical among developing economies. 
In explaining this puzzle, they introduce a political distortion into the
standard optimal fiscal policy model which encapsulates the pressures which
arise to increase public spending on the back of budget surpluses. Tornell and
Lane (1999) refer to this phenomenon as the voracity effect where powerful
groups attempt, in response to a positive revenue shock, to grab a greater
share of national wealth. With this political adjustment, Talvi and Vegh
suggest that an optimal policy response to positive shocks in the tax base will
involve both decreasing taxes and raising spending with the opposite
responses recommended during negative tax base shocks. Their model
predicts that politically-constrained optimal fiscal policy is pro-cyclical. 
Previous work suggests that Ireland’s budgetary management has
similarities with the developing country behaviour identified by Talvi and
Vegh (2000). Lane (1998) shows that Irish fiscal policy is not generally
counter-cyclical and that different elements of public expenditures are
actually pro-cyclical. Evidence is also available for the US showing that even
among G7 members, there are layers of government which demonstrate
counter-cyclical and acyclical responses to evolving national income patterns.
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particular, state governments are pro-cyclical, smoothing disposable incomes
and consumption of state residents. They find that expenditures are weakly
pro-cyclical while revenues are strongly pro-cyclical. 
While the literature is relatively rich in relation to the cyclicality of fiscal
policy, little attention has been paid to the correlation of expenditure and the
economic cycle. The standard neo-classical assumption is that government
expenditure is exogenously determined (Blanchard and Fisher, 1989). Lane
(2003) notes, if government spending is endogenised, that the optimal
comovement between government consumption and private consumption
depends on the degree of substitutability in utility between these two items.
Government consumption would be expected to move counter-cyclically if
public and private expenditure components are substitutes. 
Lane (1998) points out that government investment should be the most
acyclical component of fiscal policy given that public investment projects are
typically multi-year projects with long planning lead times and substantial
completion lag times. In fact, in a study of the OECD, Lane (2003) shows that
government investment is the most pro-cyclical component of government
spending although government consumption is also pro-cyclical.
III METHODOLOGY
The sample period for this analysis is 1969 to 2003. This paper decomposes
total government spending initially into government consumption,
government investment and government current transfers and then into their
respective discretionary and non-discretionary components. Further
adjustments are made to produce levels that are styled feasible discretionary
government consumption, investment and current transfers. Feasible
discretionary expenditure is defined as expenditure which is totally subject to
government policy choice taking account of both legal obligations and political
imperatives.
Of course, at the limit practically all government expenditure is
discretionary. Notionally, a government can choose not to pay public servants,
to renege on its national debt obligations or to abolish the social security
regime. However, certain legal obligations are imposed on government by
virtue of the need to service the national debt, to fulfil EU membership
funding requirements and to provide for the pay and pensions of certain public
office holders. Adjusting for these sums produces expenditure amounts over
which the government can exercise what we style perfect discretion. However,
the political dimension to fiscal policy management and the finite horizon of
298 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEWthe elected policymaker impose a further constraint on the level of discretion. 
Feasible discretionary government investment is taken as total
government capital expenditure less transfers. These include the costs
associated with the pre-funding of future pension liabilities, loans to and
investments in state enterprises and investments in international bodies such
as the International Monetary Fund and the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development.
Perfect discretionary government consumption is taken as total
government current expenditure adjusted for the costs of servicing and
managing the national debt, the annual contribution to the budget of the
European Union and other costs which the government is legally compelled to
fund such as the remuneration of the judiciary and the head of state. These
adjustments are only sufficient to reduce government consumption to its
perfect discretionary level. Political imperatives demand that the government
must finance cost of living increases for both public servants and welfare
recipients. These too represent an effective prior charge on the government’s
budget. This reality is accounted for by making a further adjustment to perfect
discretionary consumption. Thanks to the welfare adjustment, this
manipulation has the effect of excluding automatic stabilisers from
consideration in this component. 
Enhanced wage bills driven by year-on-year increases in the numbers
employed in the public sector and pay increases exceeding the rate of
consumer price inflation are treated as feasible discretionary consumption
items. Increases in the social welfare budget adjusted for changes in the
number of recipients that are greater than CPI awards are also included in the
analysis as feasible discretionary current transfers. The residual of perfect
discretionary consumption and transfers is included in our analysis as
automatic stabilisers. Specifically, our automatic stabilisers category includes
CPI and recruitment-adjusted changes in the public sector pay bill and the
CPI-adjusted welfare bill.
Using the short-run model outlined below, we separately regress feasible
discretionary government consumption, investment, current transfers and
automatic stabilisers on the set of independent variables. As well as providing
insights on the relative cyclicality of government expenditure components, the
model’s output can be interpreted to establish a ranking of the relative
importance of spending categories in the budget-formation process. 
3.1 Modelling Framework
Total government spending converges to some proportion of output over
the long term. This relationship can be captured by the following equation:
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where  g is the log of real government spending
y is the log of real GDP
θ is a long-run parameter
and Dt is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 between 1977 and
1986 inclusive.1
The dummy variable is included to capture the effect of periods of
irresponsible fiscal policy management.
The level of government spending as a share of output is largely
exogenously determined with the private sector playing a critical role and is
subject to shifts depending on political preferences. Barro (1990) shows that a
growth-maximising government will set its share of gross national product to
equal the share it would get if public services were a competitively supplied
input of production. He also demonstrates that the relative size of government
that maximises utility exceeds the value that maximises the growth rate only
if the elasticity of substitution between the amount of capital per worker and
the quantity of public services provided to each household-producer is greater
than unity. This share of gross national product is smaller if the government
is using taxes to finance other types of spending. Variations in government
consumption’s share of gross national product correlate negatively with
growth and savings rates. 
In the short run, government spending evolves along a path, given by
Equation (2), which is influenced but not solely determined by the relationship
between government expenditure and total output. The previous year’s
government spending growth rate, real GDP growth and a set of political
dummy variables are also used as explanatory variables. Following from
Equation (1):
∆gt = µ – δ(gt–1 – yt–1 – θ – γDt–1) + ρ1∆gt–1 + ρ2∆yt + βZt + εt (2)
where ∆g is real growth in government expenditure, ∆y is real GDP growth, Z
is a set of dummy variables capturing the impact of political factors, µ is a drift
term and εt is a stochastic error term.
This can be re-written as:
∆gt = µ + δθ + δγDt–1 – δ(gt–1 – yt–1)  + ρ1∆gt–1 + ρ2∆yt + βZt + εt (3)
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1 During this period, Irish fiscal policy was characterised by excessive spending growth,
burdensome budget deficits and an escalating public debt. At the end of the period, the budget
deficit stood at 12 per cent of GNP while the National Debt/GNP ratio reached 122 per cent. 1987
marked the start of a programme of fiscal rectitude that returned order to the public finances.All real variables are calculated using the GDP deflator. The political and
temporary factors include the stage of the electoral cycle, the political
complexion of the government and the security of the government’s
parliamentary position. The constant term in the dynamic equation is µ + δθ
being a combination of the drift term µ and the long-run parameter θ. The
coefficient on the dummy variable is δγ. It is the product of the error-correcting
(ECM) coefficient δ and the policy irresponsibility parameter γ. 
IV EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Appendix I describes the sources of the data. Appendix II presents the
results of tests, all of which confirm stationarity, on the relevant variables for
the presence of unit roots using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test. Appendix
III addresses the issue of simultaneity and reports the results of a series of
two-stage least squares regressions. These allow us to conclude that
endogeneity is not an issue and that the original estimators are consistent.
We first look at the long run before turning to issues of cyclicality. The
long-run relationship between government expenditure and GDP is explored
using least squares regression with Newey-West heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation consistent standard errors. In Table 1, we present the results
of a regression of the difference of real government expenditure and real
output (g-y) on the irresponsibility dummy, thus making the theoretically
attractive imposition of a unitary long-run coefficient in the regression of real
government expenditure on real output. The irresponsibility dummy is
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Table 1: Long-Run Difference Relationship with Irresponsibility Dummy
C SHIFT RBAR2 DW ADF RES NG RES ERS RES
g-y –1.12 0.34 0.55 0.68
(23.96) (5.15)*** (–2.38) (–9.11) (2.99)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.15]
Critical Values 1% –3.6329 –13.80 1.87
5% –2.9484 –8.10 2.97
10% –2.6130 –5.70 3.91
Notes:  t values in parentheses; p-values in square brackets. Independent variable g-y is the
difference between the logs of real government spending and real GDP. SHIFT is a dummy
variable which captures periods of fiscal irresponsibility and takes a value of 1 from 1977 to 1986
inclusive. ADF refers to the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, NG to the Ng-Perron Modified Unit
Root Test, and ERS to the Elliott-Rothenberg Point Optimal Unit Root Test.
Sources: Central Statistics Office, Department of Finance.302 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
Table 2: Short-Run Cyclicality – Unit Root Tests
Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller Test DY DG DAUTOCT DTRANFD DCONFD DINVFD
(–2.540) (–5.661) (–3.775) (–2.929) (–5.737) (–3.658)
[0.1152] [0.0000] [0.0072] [0.0561] [0.0000] [0.0095]
Critical Values 1% –3.639 –3.639 –3.646 –3.724 –3.646 –3.639
5% –2.951 –2.951 –2.954 –2.968 –2.954 –2.951
10% –2.614 –2.614 –2.616 –2.617 –2.616 –2.614
Notes: t values in parentheses; p-values in square brackets. DY is the real GDP growth rate; DG
is the percentage change in real government expenditure; DINVFD is the percentage change in
real feasible discretionary government investment; DCONFD is the percentage change in real
feasible discretionary government consumption; DTRANFD is the percentage change in real
feasible discretionary current transfers; DAUTOCT is the percentage change in residual
discretionary consumption and transfers. 
Sources: Central Statistics Office, Department of Finance.
Figure 1: Government Share of GDP
Note: Figure 1 shows Total Government Spending expressed as a percentage of Gross Domestic
Product on an annual basis
statistically significant at the 1 per cent level and is, as expected, positively
signed. While we are unable to reject the hypothesis of a unit root in the
residuals using the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test, further testing using
the Ng-Perron and the Elliott-Rothenberg unit root tests points to stationarityin the residuals. Additional testing is warranted give the low power of the ADF
test and the superior power and size properties of the Ng-Perron and Elliott-
Rothenberg tests.2 It is intuitively consistent to argue that there must be some
long-term, non-spurious relationship between government expenditure and
output and on foot of our cointegration findings, we include an error-correcting
mechanism in our evaluation of the short term. 
Turning to the short run, we examined the relationship between the
various measures of government expenditure outlined above and a number of
independent variables using least squares regression with Newey-West
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. In Table 3,
we present the results of our first set of short-run regressions with total
government spending taking the role of the dependent variable.
Our results suggest that the rate of economic growth has little impact on
overall government spending growth as the estimated coefficient of DY is
insignificantly different from zero in each of the regressions. This allows us to
reject the hypothesis of cyclicality in Irish government expenditure. However,
the inclusion of a variable which captures the relationship between
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Table 3: Short-Run Cyclicality – Total Government Spending
CD Y GGDP SHIFT RBAR2 FD W
0.04 0.20 –0.02 (0.19) 1.97
(1) (1.24) (0.46) [0.66]
[0.22] [0.65]
–0.11 –0.48 –0.18 0.09 (2.65) 2.03
(2) (1.53) (0.85) (1.98)* [0.09]
[0.13] [0.40] [0.06]
–0.26 –0.48 –0.31 0.08 0.16 (3.22) 2.08
(3) (2.66) (0.75) (2.76)*** (2.69)** [0.04]
[0.01] [0.46] [0.01] [0.01]
Notes: t values in parentheses; p-values in square brackets. Independent variables: GGDP is the
difference between the log of real government expenditure and real GDP lagged by one year;
SHIFT is a dummy variable which captures periods of fiscal irresponsibility and takes a value of
1 from 1977 to 1986 inclusive. Dependent variable: DG is the percentage change in real
government expenditure. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels
respectively.
Sources: Central Statistics Office, Department of Finance
2 See Elliott, Rothenberg and Stock (1996) and Ng and Perron (2001).government expenditure and GDP (GGDP) as an independent variable has a
positive impact on the regression’s explanatory power. In each case, the
estimated coefficient of GGDP is significantly different from zero with the null
of δ = 0 being rejected at a p-value of 0.01 when a dummy variable designed to
capture the impact of a period of fiscal policy irresponsibility (SHIFT) is
included. The GGDP variable is negatively signed. This result is intuitively
appealing as it suggests that the greater the size of government, the less
willing policymakers are to engage in further spending expansionism. The
regression results in Table 3 clearly indicate that the desire to shrink the size
of government spending or the imperative of fiscal parsimony has a far more
significant role to play in explaining momentum in total government spending
than the vagaries of the economic cycle. 
The introduction of the SHIFT dummy variable should be significant. A
priori, we would expect government spending growth to be higher in the years
1977 to 1986 given the deterioration in the quality of fiscal management which
occurred in that period. As expected, the SHIFT variable has a marked and
positive impact on the regression’s explanatory power and it is statistically
significant at the 5 per cent level. Following logic, the SHIFT dummy is
positively signed. 3
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3 Where lagged dependent variables are used throughout this paper, we eschew reporting a
Durbin-Watson d test statistic as that test assumes that the regression model does not include
lagged values of the dependent variable. In its stead, the Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange Multiplier
test is used. The null hypothesis of this test is that there is no serial correlation in the residuals.
Figure 2: Government Spending Growth and the Cycle
Note: Figure 2 shows the respective growth rates of GDP and total Government Spending.DISCRETION AND CYCLICALITY IN IRISH BUDGETARY MANAGEMENT 305
Overall, the evidence in Table 3 suggests that total government
expenditure growth is acyclical with the imperative of fiscal parsimony, as
measured by the GGDP variable, having a significant influence on spending
momentum. Moreover, overall spending growth tends to be higher during
periods of policy irresponsibility.
However, the results generated for overall government expenditure may
well be camouflaging conflicting cyclical momentum among its component
parts. Each of these components is examined in turn. It is reasonable to
assume that automatic stabilisers will be the component of public expenditure
which is most markedly counter-cyclical. The evidence of our analysis is
strongly supportive of this contention as presented in Table 4. The GDP
growth rate (DY) is statistically significant in each of the regressions
presented in the table and, in all but the simplest model, is significant at the
1 per cent level. Moreover, the coefficient is negatively signed throughout
pointing to strong counter-cyclicality in the automatic stabilising component
of government expenditure. The simplest model with DY as the sole
independent variable reports a low DW d statistic (1.38) that highlights the
risk of excluded variable specification bias. The inclusion of the fiscal
parsimony imperative (GGDP) as an independent variable augments the
explanatory power of the regression with the adjusted R2 increasing to 0.31.
The GGDP variable is strongly significant at the 1 per cent level in two of the
regressions reported and is negatively signed in each regression suggesting
that larger government output shares serve to restrain the efficacy of
automatic stabilisers. 
The addition of the SHIFT dummy does not augment the explanatory
power of the regression and the variable is statistically insignificant. This
result is intuitive as it suggests that bouts of budgetary irresponsibility have
little impact on the automatically stabilising elements of government
spending. Overall, the evidence of this set of regressions is strongly supportive
of the view that automatic stabilisers are efficiently counter-cyclical in an
Irish context with the level of economic growth being the prime determinant
of growth in this expenditure component. The size of government is of
secondary importance in this expenditure category. 
In Tables 5 and 6, we present the findings of a series of regressions with
feasible discretionary government consumption and current transfers as the
respective regressands. We would have expected to uncover some counter-
cyclicality in the case of feasible discretionary government consumption at
least. This variable can be thought of as non-automatic government
consumption: it seems reasonable to assume that policymakers would make
use of this expenditure category to smooth the cycle. However, the results of
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parsimony imperative (GGDP), momentum indicators (LDV) and the
irresponsibility dummy have extremely poor explanatory power. In fact, in no
instance in these sets of regressions can we reject the null hypothesis that the
true coefficient is zero. Our analysis suggests that real growth in feasible
discretionary consumption and feasible discretionary current transfers is
orthogonal to economic fundamentals.4
The results for feasible discretionary government investment are
presented in Table 7. As discussed earlier, this should be the component of
government expenditure that demonstrates the least amount of cyclicality due
to its multi-year nature in terms of both planning and delivery. 
The results of the two simplest regressions with DY alone and DY and
GGDP used as regressors provide conflicting signals in terms of the statistical
significance of the independent variables. Moreover, DW statistics which lie
below and within (respectively) the zone of indecision at the 5 per cent
significance level alert us to the possible presence of positive autocorrelation
4 We tested for the impact of different definitions of discretion by running a set of regressions
where all changes in both public sector pay and welfare payments rather than those payments in
excess of inflation are treated as discretionary. The results show that adjusted current transfers
are negatively correlated with the output growth rate and the government share of GDP at the 1
per cent level. Adjusted consumption is negatively correlated with the relationship between
government spending and output at the 1 per cent level. These regressions point to the presence
of a cyclical element in inflation and also suggest that spending growth in these expenditure
categories above an inflation-proofing level is not influenced by economic considerations.
Figure 3: Automatic Stabilisers and the Cycle
Note: Figure 3 shows growth in automatic stabilising Government expenditure and real GDP
growth.in the error terms. We suspect that we are dealing with a case of excluded
variable specification bias. With the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable,
the null hypothesis of no serial correlation is not rejected using the results of
the Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange Multiplier test. Moreover, the lagged
dependent variable is significant at the 10 per cent level when it is included
with the DY and GGDP variables. However, its inclusion impacts negatively
on the significance of the GGDP variable and we can no longer reject the null
hypothesis that the true value of the GGDP coefficient is equal to zero. This
result encourages us to risk specification bias by dropping the GGDP variable
from the regression. 
This move leaves us with two strongly significant independent variables
in the form of DY and LDV with the null that the true value of the coefficients
are zero being rejected at a p-value of 0.002 and 0.000 respectively. The
evidence suggests that feasible discretionary government investment is
impacted by a different set of influences than overall government expenditure.
The results of the limited regression suggest that feasible discretionary
government investment is strongly pro-cyclical and carries momentum from
the previous year. The latter result is understandable given the multi-year
nature of government capital formation planning.
Most interest, however, centres on the cyclicality result. Given the relative
size of the estimated coefficients (1.53 in the case of real GDP growth and 0.39
in the case of the lagged dependent variable), our results suggest that current
economic activity is a considerably more potent influence on the resources
310 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
Figure 4: Feasible Discretionary Investment and the Cycle
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made available for feasible discretionary investment than multi-year
budgeting. As such, the results can be interpreted as indicating a short-termist
approach on the part of domestic policymakers to government-funded fixed
capital formation.
V THE IMPACT OF FORECASTS
Given the evidence of pro-cyclicality in feasible discretionary government
investment reported earlier, we conducted a series of regressions to test the
relative importance of actual and forecast growth rates in determining this
component of public expenditure. The results are presented in Tables 8 and 9. 
In Table 8, the actual growth rate is excluded as an independent variable
while the forecast growth rate, given by the mean of the Department of
Finance’s and the OECD’s published forecast growth rates, is included. This is
a reasonable approach to take as forward spending decisions, as presented in
the annual Budget, are based on growth projections rather than actual
outturns. The results presented in Table 8 report that the forecast growth rate
is statistically insignificant as an explanatory variable where overall
government spending, feasible discretionary consumption expenditure and
feasible discretionary current transfers are the dependent variables. This
suggests that growth forecasts have little bearing on budget decisions in
Figure 5: GDP Growth Rates
Note: Figure 5 shows actual annual real GDP growth rates and the mean of OECD and
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relation to overall expenditure, transfer payments or feasible discretionary
consumption.
However, the forecast growth rate is statistically significant at the 1 per
cent level where real growth in automatic-stabilising expenditure is the
dependent variable. When the actual growth rate is added as an explanatory
variable, as shown in Table 9, the forecast growth rate is no longer statistically
significant while the actual growth outturn is significant at the 1 per cent
level. With the coefficient being negatively signed, this result is intuitively
appealing: automatic stabilising expenditure growth should have an inverse
relationship with economic growth and should be more potently affected by
actual rather than forecast activity levels. The fiscal parsimony variable is
also significant at the 1 per cent level where the actual growth rate is excluded
and at the 5 per cent level where it is included as an independent variable. It
is negatively signed suggesting that the efficacy of automatically stabilising
expenditure is adversely impacted by excessive government expenditure. 
In the regression where feasible discretionary government investment is
the dependent variable, the mean growth forecast and the lagged dependent
variable are the only statistically significant independent variables. Moreover,
the null hypothesis that the true value of the forecast coefficient equals zero is
rejected at a p-value of 0.02. The adjusted R2 in the case of this regression
where feasible discretionary investment growth is the dependent variable in
Table 8 is the highest encountered in the analysis conducted for this paper at
0.43. This result is intuitively appealing as it is most sensible for policymakers
to plan investment spending levels on the basis of growth forecasts. When we
add the actual growth rate as an explanatory variable, the adjusted R2 eases
slightly to 0.41 while the mean forecast growth rate becomes the only
statistically significant explanatory variable. We reject the null hypothesis
that the true value of the forecast coefficient equals zero at a p-value of 0.01. 
The strength of the relationship between actual feasible discretionary
investment growth and forecast GDP growth levels suggests that
policymakers have great faith in their own forecasts. The size of the coefficient
of forecast growth, at 3.23 where the actual growth outturn is included as an
independent variable, suggests, once again, that feasible discretionary
investment spending is strongly pro-cyclical. The significance of the various
forecasts combined with the size of the coefficients suggests that this sub-
component of government expenditure is deliberately pro-cyclical. 
Our analysis offers the conclusion that the pro-cyclicality of Irish feasible
discretionary government investment arises not on the back of forecast
failures but rather by design. Policymakers appear to devote resources to
capital investment when economic activity generates such resources, thus
pointing us towards the conclusion that capital investment is the residual in
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Table 10: Short-Run Cyclicality – IV Estimation
CD Y GGDP SHIFT LDV RBAR2 F
GOV –0.26 –0.48 –0.31 0.08 0.16 (3.22)
(1) (2.66) (0.75) (2.76)*** (2.69)** [0.04]
OLS [0.01] [0.46] [0.01] [0.01]
GOV –0.29 –1.33 –0.38 0.08 0.08 (2.92)
(2) (2.52) (1.13) (2.69)** (1.87)* [0.05]
TSLS [0.02] [0.27] [0.01] [0.07]
AUTO –0.06 –1.42 –0.18 –0.01 0.19 0.30 (4.47)
(3) (0.69) (3.13)*** (2.34)** (0.07) (1.74)* [0.006]
OLS [0.50] [0.004] [0.03] [0.95] [0.09]
AUTO –0.08 –2.09 –0.24 –0.002 0.10 0.24 (2.34)
(4) (0.85) (1.59) (1.76)* (0.06) (0.43) [0.08]
TSLS [0.40] [0.12] [0.09] [0.95] [0.67]
CON –1.74 357.52 28.47 13.03 –0.09 –0.08 (0.41)
(5) (0.05) (0.94) (0.62) (0.82) (0.96) [0.80]
OLS [0.96] [0.36] [0.54] [0.42] [0.35]
CON 3.84 514.50 42.21 13.38 –0.11 –0.09 (0.23)
(6) (0.06) (0.68) (0.48) (0.54) (0.53) [0.92]
TSLS [0.96] [0.51] [0.63] [0.59] [0.60]
TRAN 27.69 195.83 52.08 8.32 –0.07 –0.11 (0.18)
(7) (0.51) (0.72) (0.71) (0.66) (0.88) [0.94]
OLS [0.61] [0.48] [0.48] [0.51] [0.38]
TRAN 9.24 –253.43 10.45 7.95 –0.02 –0.14 (0.16)
(8) (0.08) (0.21) (0.07) (0.20) (0.10) [0.96]
TSLS [0.94] [0.84] [0.94] [0.84] [0.92]
INV –0.06 1.53 0.39 0.28 (7.52)
(9) (1.55) (3.45)*** (3.90)*** [0.01]
OLS [0.13] [0.002] [0.000]
INV –0.12 2.80 0.36 0.18 (8.27)
(10) (2.38) (3.03)*** (2.31)** [0.001]
TSLS [0.02] [0.01] [0.03]
Notes: t values in parentheses; p-values in square brackets. Independent variables: GGDP is the
difference between the log of real government expenditure and real GDP lagged by one year; DY
is the real GDP growth rate; SHIFT is a dummy variable which captures periods of fiscal
irresponsibility and takes a value of 1 from 1977 to 1986 inclusive. ***, **, * denote significance
at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels respectively.VI CONCLUSIONS
The evidence in this paper suggests that while Irish government
expenditure is in aggregate acyclical, there are substantial differences in the
cyclicality of the sub-components. Overall government expenditure appears to
be more strongly influenced by considerations of fiscal probity rather than the
rate of GDP growth. However, our analysis of disaggregated expenditures
suggests that this overall result serves to camouflage the co-existence of
marked pro- and counter-cyclicality. Automatic stabilisers report a pronounced
counter-cyclicality which is appealing from an efficiency viewpoint and
underpinned by theoretical considerations. Two of the new sub-components of
expenditure which we examined, namely feasible discretionary government
consumption and feasible discretionary current transfers show no evidence of
any cyclicality. In fact, there seems to be no relation between these series and
any of the independent variables we identified for this paper. We conclude that
momentum in these areas where policymakers have real discretion and full
freedom to manoeuvre is orthogonal to economic fundamentals. 
Our analysis points to marked pro-cyclicality in feasible discretionary
government investment. Moreover, official growth forecasts are more
statistically significant in the relevant regressions than actual growth
outturns. This finding leads us to the conclusion that, not only is government
feasible discretionary investment pro-cyclical, it is deliberately so. The
Department of Finance does appear to have believed prevailing consensus
forecasts over the period under study. The evidence we present strongly
supports the contention that when Irish policymakers have the money, they
spend it on feasible discretionary investment. As a consequence, we can
conclude that government investment has been the residual in the Irish
budgetary process over the 1969 to 2003 period. 
This approach to the allocation of capital resources imposes clear short-
term restraints on the effective management of the economic cycle and could,
through a stop-start approach to government-funded capital formation, reduce
the economy’s sustainable growth potential. The hope must be that recent
changes to the capital resource allocation structure, outlined below, will
reduce the pronounced pro-cyclicality of feasible discretionary investment.
In Budget 2004, the Government announced the introduction of rolling
five-year multi-annual envelopes for all investment areas and committed itself
to allocate 5 per cent of GNP to Exchequer-funded capital investment over the
period 2004-2008. Moreover, greater flexibility in the allocation of capital
resources between years has been promoted by allowing individual
Government Departments to carry over to the following year any unspent
Exchequer capital allocations up to a maximum of 10 per cent of each annual
DISCRETION AND CYCLICALITY IN IRISH BUDGETARY MANAGEMENT 317capital subhead. The commitment to allocate 5 per cent of (forecast) GNP
should significantly reduce the cyclicality of government investment over the
years ahead.
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Social security data were drawn from the annual Statistical Abstract of
Ireland and from the annual Statistical Report of the Department of Social
and Family Affairs.
National accounts data were taken from the CSO’s annual National
Income & Expenditure publications.
Fiscal data were drawn from the Department of Finance’s annual Finance
Accounts.
Numbers employed in the public sector were sourced from the Labour
Force Survey and provided by the Economic and Social Research Institute.
Growth forecasts are taken from the OECD’s June Economic Outlook and
individual country report publications and the Department of Finance’s
Economic Review and Outlook publications.
Live register data were provided by Datastream.
Fiscal years: Until 1974, Irish fiscal accounts were prepared on the basis
of the old fiscal year, April 6th to April 5th. 1975 was the first year in which
calendar-based data were made available. Adjustments are made to previous
years’ data using spending growth trends to produce calendar estimates for
the period 1969 to 1974. 
Euro changeover: In 1999, Ireland joined Economic and Monetary Union
and from 2001 all data releases are denominated solely in euro. The necessary
adjustment for comparability is made by converting euro amounts into punts
at the irrevocable fixed rate at which Ireland joined the single currency.
Establishment of An Post and Telecom Éireann: These entities were
previously part of central government and their expenditures were treated as
government consumption and investment until 1984. Amounts spent by the
predecessor of these bodies were excluded for the period 1969 to 1984 for
comparability purposes.
No explicit discretionary/non-discretionary capital split for 1969-1973: To
overcome this data deficiency we assume that the average discretionary/non-
discretionary capital expenditure split for the period 1969-1973 was the same
as that in the 1975-1977 period.
Number of Social Welfare Beneficiaries: This data series is incomplete. A
proxy was built taking the total number of recipients of old age pensions,
retirement pensions, blind pensions, disability benefits and the total number
of children for whom children’s allowances/benefits are paid. 
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The results of our unit root tests are presented in Table 2. For all the
variables presented here other than real GDP growth (DY) and real feasible
discretionary current transfers growth (DTRANFD), we can confidently reject
the null hypothesis that there is a unit root and each of these time series is
stationary. In the cases of real government expenditure growth (DG), growth
in automatic stabiliser expenditure (DAUTOCT) and real feasible
discretionary government consumption growth (DCONFD), the null
hypothesis can be rejected at the 1 per cent level. In the case of real feasible
discretionary investment growth (DINVFD), the null hypothesis of a unit root
can be rejected at the 5 per cent level while the null can be rejected at the 10
per cent level in the case of real feasible discretionary current transfers
growth (DTRANFD). In relation to real GDP growth, the test results suggest
that this time series is borderline non-stationary with a p-value of 0.115.
However, it is reasonable to treat DY as a stationary variable given theoretical
support: GDP growth rates do have a mean-reverting tendency.
APPENDIX III: INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE ESTIMATION
In order to investigate the possible existence of endogeneity between
economic growth and growth in overall government expenditures, a regression
using two-stage least squares (TSLS) was run. The results are presented in
Table 10. The lagged value of economic growth is employed as the
instrumental variable. The TSLS output is broadly similar to that generated
by the OLS regression allowing us to conclude that endogeneity is not an issue
and that the original estimators are consistent. TSLS regressions were also
performed for each of the government expenditure subcomponents considered
in the paper. Again, the results, generated by both OLS and TSLS procedures
are broadly similar. The greatest divergence in results is reported for
automatic stabilising expenditure (AUTO) where the significance of the
instrumental variable (one year lag of economic growth) falls outside the 10
per cent level compared to the 1 per cent reported for actual economic growth.
This result is in line with expectations given the intended simultaneity of
changes in economic activity and automatic-stabilising expenditure by
government. 
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